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CORPORATE AIDING AND ABETTING 
LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE: A LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE 
Michael Garvey*
Abstract: Since the landmark decision in Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, U.S. courts 
have struggled determining actionable claims under the enigmatic Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS). While the Supreme Court recognized the viability of 
the ATS as a jurisdictional statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, its scope was 
restricted to an amorphous “eighteenth century paradigm.” This model 
has proven to be a murky standard. One of the most contentious and un-
certain claims under the ATS involves corporate liability for aiding and 
abetting human rights violations. This Comment argues that based upon 
the limited holding of Sosa, aiding and abetting liability would not be rec-
ognized as an actionable claim under the ATS. Therefore, similar to the 
Torture Victim Protection Act, it is Congress’s role to clarify the ATS and 
ensure that victims of human rights are able to hold complicit corpora-
tions liable. 
Introduction 
 In 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a 
Paraguan official residing in New York was civilly liable to the family of 
Dr. Joel Filártiga for the torture and death of Dr. Filártiga’s son, Joelito.1 
According to Dr. Filártiga, Inspector Americo Norberto Pena-Irala mur-
dered Joelito to quiet Dr. Filártiga, an outspoken critic of Paraguay’s dic-
tator Alfredo Stroessner.2 What was remarkable about the case was that 
the torture and murder occurred in Paraguay, and neither party was a 
United States citizen.3
 Despite each party’s lack of citizenship, the Filártigas were able to 
seek redress for their suffering in the United States federal courts four 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2008–2009). 
1 Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
2 Id.; Jeffrey Davis, Justice Across Borders: The Struggle for Human Rights in 
U.S. Courts 18 (2008). 
3 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. The Alien Tort Statute was by and large unknown before 
the Filártiga case. See Davis, supra note 2, at 3. The Filártigas’ lawyers at the Center for Con-
stitutional Rights were skeptical of utilizing the act because they were afraid that “any such 
suit would be laughed out of court.” Id. 
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years after Joelito’s death.4 The basis for the decision rested upon an 
obscure section of the original Judiciary Act known as the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, or the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).5 This provision, crafted in 
1789 as part of the Judiciary Act, states that federal district courts “shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”6
 Judge Irving Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, determined that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the Filártiga’s allegations of torture and extrajudicial murder.7 Justice 
Kaufman stated that the judiciary may recognize certain universally 
recognized violations of international law under the ATS’s grant of ju-
risdiction for violations against the “law of nations.”8 Because deliberate 
torture and murder violate universally accepted norms of international 
law, the ATS provides federal jurisdiction “whenever an alleged torturer 
is found and served with process by an alien within our borders.”9 
Pena-Irala was residing in Brooklyn, New York at the time and therefore 
he was subject to the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit.10
 Twenty-four years after Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, the Supreme Court 
decided its only case under the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.11 Writing 
for the majority, Justice David Souter held that while the ATS is a purely 
jurisdictional statute, it is not rendered “stillborn” without a cause of 
action to compliment its jurisdictional grant.12 Instead, the Court held 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Davis, supra note 2, at 3. 
5 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
6 § 1350. 
7 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
8 Id. at 880. At the time of the first Judiciary Act, the “law of nations” was considered 
part of federal common law. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004). The law of 
nations governed the norms of behavior of nation states with one another, the conduct of 
individuals outside of their respective borders but “carrying on an international savor” (for 
example, mercantile questions), and rules binding individuals in conduct that overlapped 
with the considerations of state relationships. Id. at 715. The latter included three specific 
offenses identified by Blackstone: violation of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy. Id. While the prevailing conception of common law has changed 
as a result of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the law of nations still represents an interstitial 
area of substantive law that federal courts may recognize under the common law. Id. at 
729; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 58, 78 (1934). 
9 Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
10 Davis, supra note 2, at 18. By happenstance, Dr. Filártiga’s daughter, Dolly, deter-
mined Pena-Irala’s whereabouts during a trip to Washington, DC. Id. 
11 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738. 
12 Id. at 714, 719. Justice Souter rejected the argument that the first Congress passed 
the ATS “as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a further 
Congress . . . that might, some day, authorize the creation of causes of action.” Id. at 719. 
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that the ATS enables federal courts to hear a finite amount of claims 
defined by the law of nations, as incorporated into federal common 
law.13 While the Court did not expressly enumerate actionable claims 
under the ATS, it did qualify that courts should require claims based 
“on the present day law of nations to rest on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world.”14 Since Sosa, courts have 
struggled with identifying claims that fit into the narrow class of claims 
permitted under the ATS.15
 One of the most contentious and elusive questions that remains 
unresolved under the ATS involves the liability of corporations for aid-
ing and abetting human rights violations.16 Increasingly over the past 
twenty years, victims of human rights violations have sought to hold 
complicit corporations liable for their involvement in gross human 
rights violations.17 Because the individual perpetrators are often low 
level judgment-proof actors, complicit corporations provide victims 
with a higher profile culpable party that is better able to provide mone-
tary redress.18 Furthermore, because the corporations are frequently 
multinational, victims are better able to locate and effectuate service of 
process than if they are reliant on the happenstance of an individual 
being found within the borders of the United States.19 Finally, a more 
“constructive engagement” is furthered in developing nations by hold-
ing corporations liable for complicit conduct than if corporations stand 
idly by while condoning or abetting human rights violations.20
 The Justice Department adamantly opposed corporate aiding and 
abetting liability during President George W. Bush’s administration, 
arguing that aiding and abetting liability is inconsistent with judicial 
restraint in cases involving foreign affairs and political questions, an 
                                                                                                                      
13 Id. at 712. 
14 Id. at 725. 
15 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 738 (refusing to recognize illegal detention of less than a day as 
actionable under the ATS); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167–69 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (refusing to recognize claims of environmental torts and cultural genocide un-
der the ATS); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d. 289, 
319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing corporate liability for jus cogens violations). 
16 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 n.20; see, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 
254, 260–61 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam), aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom., Am. Izuzu Mo-
tors, Inc. v. Ntsebza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
17 See Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 936 (9th Cir. 2002). 
18 See id. 
19 See Filártiga, 630 F.2d 876. 
20 See Richard Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under 
the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 207, 222–23 
(2008). 
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impermissible foray into federal common law, and an improper inter-
ference with foreign relations.21 In contrast, human rights groups have 
traditionally argued that aiding and abetting liability for gross human 
rights violations has long been recognized since the Nuremburg Tribu-
nal in 1945.22 They argue that aiding and abetting liability is incorpo-
rated into federal common law as an international norm actionable 
under the paradigm enunciated in Sosa.23 While no inter-circuit dis-
agreement currently exists over aiding and abetting liability, its viability 
is in no way certain.24 Furthermore, there remains disagreement over 
the appropriate level of complicity required.25 Is the standard drawn 
from international law or domestic law?26
 An opportunity to answer these questions was side-tracked when 
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. 
Ntsebeza.27 This petition arose out of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peal’s decision in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., which recog-
nized aiding and abetting liability under the ATS.28 The petition was 
denied due to a lack of quorum when four of the nine justices recused 
themselves on account of conflict of interests.29 The refusal to hear this 
                                                                                                                      
21 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8–16, Am. 
Isuzu Motors, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (No. 07–919). 
22 Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the 
Courts, 6 Nw. U. J. Int’l Hum. Rts. 304, 307 (2008) (citing Nuremburg Charter, Agree-
ment for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Charter II, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S. 280). The Nuremburg Charter imposed criminal liability on “accomplices par-
ticipating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy.” Id. 
23 Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 11, Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254 (No. 05–2326). 
24 Cassel, supra note 22, at 322. 
25 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring); id. at 288 (Hall, J., con-
curring), id. at 337(Korman, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Judge Katzmann 
and Judge Korman ruled that aiding and abetting liability is governed by international law 
and requires a mens rea of purpose. Id. at 277 (Katzmann, J., dissenting), 337 (Korman J., 
concurring in part & dissenting in part). However Judge Hall contended that the model 
should be drawn from federal common law and requires a mens rea of knowledge. Id. at 
284, 288 (Hall, J., concurring). 
26 See id. at 277, 284. 
27 Am. Isuzu Motors, 128 S. Ct. at 2424. 
28 See id.; Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264. 
29 See Linda Greenhouse, Conflicts for Justices Halt Appeal in Apartheid Case, N.Y. Times, 
May 13, 2008, at A14. Justice Alito owns stock in Exxon-Mobil and Bristol-Myers Squibb. See 
id. Justice Breyer owns stock in several of the companies named. See id. Chief Justice Rob-
erts owns stock in Hewlett-Packard. See id. Justice Kennedy’s reason for recusal appears to 
be his son’s employment with another defendant, Credit Suisse, a conflict that has led the 
justice to disqualify himself in previous cases as well. See id. 
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petition means that the scope and viability of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity remains in question.30
 This Comment argues that Congress, and not the courts, should 
resolve this uncertainty by providing a clear answer to the question of 
corporate liability under the ATS.31 Part I discusses the Supreme 
Court’s limited holding in Sosa which cautiously restricted the judici-
ary’s ability to uncover causes of action from federal common law un-
der the ATS.32 Part II then explains how the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ most recent decision in Khulumani recognizing aiding and 
abetting liability does not presently conform to the limited holding of 
Sosa.33 Part III details the Torture Victim Prevention Act and argues 
that Congress is the legitimate branch to resolve questions arising from 
a statute which delves so deeply into the actions of foreign sovereigns.34 
Finally, Part IV concludes that when Congress does address such ques-
tions, it should provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting liabil-
ity.35 By providing a cause of action for aiding and abetting liability, a 
clear standard of liability will be set with a uniform level of complicity, 
thereby avoiding an inevitable clash with the Supreme Court’s limited 
holding in Sosa.36
                                                                                                                      
30 See Am. Isuzu Motors, 128 S. Ct. at 2424. 
31 Aiding and abetting liability under the ATS will not withstand the limited applica-
tion of Sosa. See Sosa 542 U.S. at 732; Virginia Monken Gomez, Note, The Sosa Standard: 
What Does It Mean for Future ATS Litigation?, 33 Pepp. L. Rev. 469, 499 (2006) (“Evaluated 
on its own, aiding and abetting would seem to meet the same fate as Alvarez-Machain’s 
arbitrary detention claim [in Sosa] . . . . In fact, a broad notion such as aiding and abetting 
would seem to be the very type of claim the Supreme Court seeks to invalidate by setting 
forth its stringent standard.”). It is important that Congress recognize aiding and abetting 
liability as an actionable claim for the development of human rights. See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 
953. 
32 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–28. 
33 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 254. 
34 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731. 
35 See Hannah Bornstein, Note, The Alien Tort Claims Act in 2007: Resolving the Delicate 
Balance Between Judicial and Legislative Authority, 82 Ind. L.J. 1077, 1097–98 (2007). Ms. 
Bornstein argues that Congress should recognize corporate aiding and abetting liability 
under the ATS. Id. However, Ms. Bornstein also maintains that courts may properly recog-
nize aiding and abetting liability as Congress has implicitly recognized their ability by not 
amending or repealing the ATS. Id. at 1089. Given the Supreme Court’s limited holding in 
Sosa, this Comment argues that aiding and abetting liability is not well defined enough for 
courts to provide actionable claims under the ATS. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
36 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731. 
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I. The Limited Holding of Sosa 
 In 2004 the Supreme Court heard its first and only case under the 
ATS.37 In Sosa, the plaintiff Humberto Alvarez-Machain brought suit 
against Jose Sosa and several Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
officials for his illegal detention.38 Alvarez was wanted by the DEA after 
his indictment for the murder of a DEA agent.39 However, the DEA was 
unable to obtain his extradition from an uncooperative Mexican gov-
ernment.40 The DEA enlisted Sosa, a Mexican citizen, to abduct Alvarez 
and bring him to the United States where federal officers arrested Alva-
rez.41 After being acquitted of murder, Alvarez brought suit against the 
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act and against Sosa un-
der the ATS for violating the law of nations.42
 In addressing Alvarez’s claim against Sosa, the Court first needed 
to determine whether or not the ATS provides a cause of action for in-
ternational violations, or whether it was merely a jurisdictional statute.43 
The Supreme Court held that it was both.44 Although the ATS is a ju-
risdictional statute, the original drafters likely expected the courts to 
apply their grant of jurisdiction to redress specific and limited viola-
tions of the “law of nations” recognized at common law.45 Relying on 
Blackstone’s list of specific offenses against the law of nations addressed 
under English common law, the Court surmised that the drafters had 
three universally recognized claims in mind: violation of safe conduct, 
infringement upon the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.46
 While the Court did not limit the current application of the ATS to 
these three specific violations, it did command that courts use the same 
“eighteenth century paradigm” that the drafters envisioned.47 That is, 
                                                                                                                      
37 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004). 
38 See id. at 697. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. at 698. 
41 Id. 
42 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698. 
43 See id. at 714. 
44 See id. at 724. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 715. The impetus for the Alien Tort Claims Act seems to stem from the ini-
tial inability of the Continental Congress to “cause infractions of treaties, or the law of 
nations to be punished.” Id. at 716. This inability was highlighted in May of 1784 when the 
Continental Congress could not provide redress for the so called “Marbois incident.” Id. 
Specifically, the United States was embarrassed by not being able to deal with an assault on 
the Secretary of the French Legion in Philadelphia by French adventurer DeLongchamps. 
Id. 
47 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
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for a claim to be viable under the ATS, it must be as specific and as uni-
versally accepted as the three Blackstone violations.48
 In Sosa, Justice Souter determined that the illegal detention claim 
at issue lacked the certainty and specificity necessary to come within the 
stringent eighteenth century paradigm that the Court had just estab-
lished.49 The Court reasoned that unlike crimes such as torture or 
genocide, which are clearly defined and invariably recognized as con-
trary to the law of nations, a claim for illegal detention could vary from 
a serious violation to something as mundane as a botched warrant.50 
Because of the difficulty in defining which illegal detentions cross the 
line into actionable claims, the Court held that Mr. Alvarez’s claim 
failed.51
 By requiring that the violation be universal and specific, the Court 
also stressed judicial caution in discerning actionable claims.52 In par-
ticular, Justice Souter highlighted five reasons why judicial application of 
the ATS is extremely limited.53 First, he noted that the idea of judicial 
recognition of “common law” has changed from the statute’s inception 
to present day.54 No longer is common law considered “discovered,” but 
rather, it is viewed in a positivistic way as the result of judicial creation.55 
Second, the judiciary’s role in creating federal common law was drasti-
cally reduced by its decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins; since 
Erie, “the general practice has been to look for legislative guidance be-
fore exercising innovative authority over substantive law.”56 Third, the 
Court recognized that the decision to create private causes of action is 
generally best left to the judgment of the legislative branch.57 Fourth, 
the Court recognized the clear potential for infringement upon the dis-
cretion of the legislative and executive branches by unfettered restric-
tions on actionable claims.58 Finally the Court called for restraint due to 
                                                                                                                      
 
48 See id. at 732 (“[W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private 
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less 
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”). 
49 See id. at 738. 
50 See id. at 737–38. 
51 See id. at 738. 
52 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
53 See id. at 725–29. 
54 See id. at 725. 
55 Id. at 725. 
56 Id. at 726. 
57 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. 
58 See id. 
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the lack of any specific mandate by Congress to create new actionable 
violations of the “law of nations.”59
 Despite these powerful limitations, Justice Souter recognized a lim-
ited exception that allows the judiciary to recognize specific and uni-
versally accepted violations.60 In support of this exception, Justice 
Souter noted that Congress enacted the Torture Victim Prevention Act 
(TVPA) in response to the judiciary’s decision in Filártiga.61 The TVPA 
provides clear statutory authorization for action involving torture and 
extrajudicial killing, thereby affirming the decision of Filártiga.62
 Other than its requirement that judges remain “vigilant” in their 
recognition of the ATS claims, the Supreme Court did not provide a 
bright-line standard for other judges to follow.63 However, the Court 
did refer to corporate complicity litigation in the Second Circuit that 
involved victims of apartheid.64 While the Court did not explicitly an-
swer whether it considered the victims’ claims actionable, it did suggest 
that the litigation involved political questions better left to the other 
two branches of government.65
                                                                                                                      
[T]he potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of 
recognizing such causes should make courts particularly wary of impinging 
on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing for-
eign affairs. . . . Since many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for 
the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse 
foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great 
caution. 
Id. at 727–28. 
59 See id. at 728. 
60 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (“[T]he judicial power should be exercised on the under-
standing that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a nar-
row class of international norms today.”). 
61 See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728, 731. 
62 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (adding that “[the court] would welcome any congressional 
guidance in exercising jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations”). 
63 See id. at 729. 
64 See id. at 732 n.20 (“A related consideration [of whether a norm is sufficiently defi-
nite] is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given 
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corpora-
tion or individual.”). 
65 See id. at 733 n.21. 
[T]here are now pending in Federal District Court several class actions seek-
ing damages from various corporations alleged to have participated in, or 
abetted, the regime of apartheid. . . . In such cases, there is a strong argument 
that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view 
of the case’s impact on foreign policy. 
Id. 
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II. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Khulumani 
 The most public and expansive litigation to date under the ATS 
commenced in 2004, when victims of apartheid era South Africa sued 
nearly every major corporation operating in South Africa during that 
period.66 The victims in Khulumani v. Barclay International Bank Ltd. in-
stituted suit against approximately fifty corporate defendants and hun-
dreds of “corporate Does” for “willingly collaborating with the govern-
ment of South Africa in maintaining a repressive, racially based system 
known as ‘apartheid.’”67 After the district court determined that the 
plaintiffs had failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the 
ATS, the Court of Appeals reversed, recognizing aiding and abetting 
liability as a viable cause of action under the ATS.68
 In a concurring opinion, Judge Katzmann explained that the dis-
trict court’s substantive evaluation of the aiding and abetting claim was 
improperly tainted by prudential considerations, such as the foreign 
                                                                                                                      
66 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007) (per cu-
riam), aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom., Am. Izuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 
(2008). 
67 Id. at 258. The Government of South Africa opposes the litigation. Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 21, at 2. The President of South Africa spoke 
out against the litigation in front of the National Assembly stating that it is “completely 
unacceptable that matters that [a]re central to the future of our country should be adjudi-
cated upon in foreign courts which [bear] no responsibility for the wellbeing of our coun-
try and the observance of the perspective contained in our Constitution on the promotion 
of national reconciliation.” Id. at 19. While the government seems to oppose the litigation, 
prominent and distinguished South Africans, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, support 
it. Sampson Mulugeta, Apartheid Suits Reach Overseas, Newsday, Sept. 14, 2002, at A15. 
Other nations have also stood in opposition to suits against defendant corporations incor-
porated within their borders. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 
21, at 1a–6a. The government of the United Kingdom argued in a letter to Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice that the lawsuit “infringes [upon] the sovereign rights of States to 
regulate their citizens and matters in their own territory.” Id. at 4a–6a. 
68 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 260. Besides the disagreement over whether aiding and 
abetting is universally accepted and definite enough to fit within the ATS, the court faced 
another formidable challenge over whether the decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver prevented this type of liability in the ATS cases. See 511 U.S. 164, 
182 (1994); Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282 (Katzmann, J., concurring). In Central Bank, the 
Supreme Court held that aiding and abetting liability must be explicitly listed in the statu-
tory text. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 182 (“[W]hen Congress enacts a statute under which 
a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant’s viola-
tion of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also 
sue aiders and abettors.”). Judge Katzmann disregarded the district court’s adherence to 
Central Bank, instead arguing that the norm for providing aiding and abetting liability was 
not a domestic statute but the law of nations, and therefore Central Bank was inapposite. See 
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 282 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
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policy consequences.69 While recognizing that prudential considera-
tions are proper and should be conducted upon remand, the court 
maintained that the determination of the viability of an aiding and 
abetting claim is a separate inquiry from the case-specific prudential 
concerns highlighted by the Supreme Court in Sosa.70
 Turning to the viability of the victims’ claim, Judge Katzmann can-
vassed various sources of international law to determine whether, as 
required by Sosa, the requisite “universal recognition” of aiding and 
abetting liability existed in the international community.71 From the 
London Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremburg, to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the mili-
tary commissions set up after September 11, 2001, Judge Katzmann 
noted that aiding and abetting has been repeatedly recognized as an 
accepted form of liability.72 Moreover, Judge Katzmann found the pro-
visions requiring liability in the London Charter and the ICTY Statute 
to be particularly significant because each statute was “intended to cod-
ify existing norms of customary international law.”73
 While international acceptance is certainly key to the recognition 
of any claim under the ATS, it is only one of the requisite standards that 
Sosa set forward in order to determine if a claim is cognizable.74 As pre-
viously noted, a claim under the ATS must have both international “ac-
ceptance” and “definite content” to fall within the stringent eighteenth 
century paradigm that Justice Souter enunciated in Sosa.75 The latter 
requirement serves to quiet any concerns regarding judicial common 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 262 n.12 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
70 See id. at 263 (per curiam). 
71 See id. at 270–74 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
72 See id. at 270–71. The district court reasoned that because the Rome Statute and the 
statutes for the ICTY and ICTR related to criminal, and not civil, liability, they were not 
applicable. Id. at 270 n.5. However, Judge Katzmann rebutted the court’s reluctance to 
apply these statutes, stating that “the distinction finds no support in our case law, which 
has consistently relied on criminal law norms in establishing the content of customary 
international law for the purposes of the ATCA [Alien Tort Claims Act].” Khulumani, 504 
F.3d at 270 n.5 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
73 See id. at 274. 
74 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
75 See id.; Philip Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising Under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 457, 479–80 (2007). Mr. Scarborough also recognized the 
problem with utilizing an unformed standard of liability from international law because, 
“adopting a new international rule wholesale subjects businesses to evolving standards of 
international law decided by forums over which there is little or no democratic control.” 
Scarborough, supra, at 480. 
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law lawmaking and imposes judicial restraint on the judiciary’s federal 
common lawmaking ability.76
 In canvassing the international scope of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity, Judge Katzmann ultimately incorporated the Rome Statute as his 
standard for liability under the Alien Tort Claims Act.77 Judge Katz-
mann remarked that the language of the Rome Statute was influential 
in his choice because, “unlike other sources of international legislation, 
[the Rome Statute] articulates the mens rea required for aiding and 
abetting liability.”78 However, it seems difficult to characterize an inter-
national violation as specific and definite if only one legislative source 
provides a clear level of requisite complicity.79 In contrast to the Rome 
Statute’s requirement for a purposeful mens rea, the ICTY and the ICTR 
tribunal decisions hold that liability is cognizable when an individual 
provides assistance with “the knowledge that the acts performed by the 
aider and abettor assist in the commission of the specific crime of the 
principal.”80 Judge Katzmann even conceded that the definiteness of 
the Rome Statute’s definition was ultimately uncertain.81 As evidenced 
by the three varying opinions of Khulumani, while general recognition 
of aiding and abetting liability exists in the international community, it 
lacks the definite character necessary to appease the stringent para-
digm set up by the Supreme Court in Sosa.82
 Although courts may properly identify and recognize violations of 
international law that are specific and definite, any exercise that re-
quires the judicial molding of a claim runs up against the arguments 
for judicial caution outlined in Sosa.83 Thus, the aiding and abetting 
claim that the Second Circuit crafted in Khulumani conflicts with the 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
77 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 21 U.N.T.S. 90; 
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
78 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275. 
79 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
80 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 278 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
81 See id. at 275–76 (Katzmann, J., concurring). “In drawing upon the Rome Statute, I 
recognize that it has yet to be construed by the International Criminal Court; its precise 
contours and the extent to which it may differ from customary international law thus re-
main somewhat uncertain.” Id. 
82 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. Judge Katzmann notes that his definition “is not necessarily 
set in stone.” Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring). Mr. Scarborough also 
notes that while international third party liability is gaining widespread acceptance, its 
“contours are still in flux and could change . . . [and] [t]he developing nature of the stan-
dard indicates there is general agreement on the underlying principle but continued de-
bate about the specific way in which the standard should be implemented.” Scarborough, 
supra note 75, at 479–80. 
83 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725–29. 
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ideological shift noted in Sosa in regard to the common law.84 As com-
mon law was no longer regarded as “discovered” or “found” after the 
Court’s decision in Erie, judges should be particularly weary in formu-
lating their own standards of liability under the auspices of their federal 
common lawmaking ability.85 Because aiding and abetting liability is 
not clearly defined at international law, any recognition thereof neces-
sarily involves judicial formulation of a proper standard of complicity or 
liability.86 While Judge Katzmann required purpose for a requisite level 
of complicity under the ATS, in his concurring opinion, Judge Hall 
considered knowledge sufficient.87 In one instance while a defendant 
may be liable for being “aware” of his role in a tortuous activity, in an-
other he or she would not be liable unless it was their conscious “pur-
pose of facilitating the crime.”88 If neither the source nor the scope of 
aiding and abetting liability is certain, the court should defer to the leg-
islative branch for guidance.89
III. The Torture Victim Protection Act and the Role of 
Congress in Creating Aiding and Abetting Liability 
 In 1992, Congress codified the Filártiga decision by passing the 
TVPA as an amendment to section 1350.90 The TVPA creates a federal 
cause of action for both aliens and citizens of the United States “against 
an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, 
of any foreign nation—(1) subjects an individual to torture . . . or (2) 
                                                                                                                      
84 See id. at 726. 
85 See id. at 725–26. 
86 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 275–76 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 288 (Hall, J., concurring). 
88 See id. at 275–76, 288. As is shown, the determination of the proper mens rea un-
doubtedly affects the substantive nature of the offence. See id. Therefore, the notion that 
accessorial liability is an “ancillary rule” which meets the Sosa standard anytime it is at-
tached to a universally recognized underlying offense is misguided as both the source and 
the standard for the substantive mens rea are uncertain. See id.; Herz, supra note 20, at 214. 
89 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727 (“[T]his Court has recently and repeatedly said that a deci-
sion to create a private right of action is one better left to the legislative judgment in the 
great majority of cases.”). 
90 Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)); 138 Cong. Rec. S2667 (1992). Congress based its 
authority to create the Torture and Victim Protection Act on two Constitutional grounds. 138 
Cong. Rec. S2667 (1992). First, on the Article III grant to the Federal courts to hear cases 
“arising under” the law of the United States (which includes international law). Id.; see U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Second, on its own authority in Article I Section 8, which authorizes 
Congress to “define and punish . . . offenses against the Law of Nations.” U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 10. 
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subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing.”91 The act also defines 
both “torture” and “extrajudicial killing.”92
 The purpose of the act is twofold.93 First, it was intended to pro-
vide a clarification of those causes of action already deemed to be ac-
tionable under the ATS.94 Second, the TVPA extends a cause of action 
to United States citizens for torture and extrajudicial murder commit-
ted abroad.95 Unlike the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act is not limited to aliens: it extends the cause of action to U.S. 
citizens as well as non-U.S. citizens.96 Despite the addition of a cause of 
action for U.S. citizens, the TVPA only addresses the two basic and uni-
versally accepted causes of action of torture and extrajudicial killing.97 
The ATS remains the sole remedy for every other international human 
rights violation.98
 While limited in scope, the value of the TVPA lies with its clear ex-
pression of actionable claims and standards of liability.99 As torture and 
extrajudicial killing would likely be considered actionable claims under 
the ATS because of their universal condemnation and definite charac-
ter in international law, the TVPA does not substantively add to or mod-
                                                                                                                      
91 106 Stat. at 73–74. 
92 Id. The definition of “torture” closely follows the definition contained in the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; S. Rep. No. 102–
249, at 6 (1991). The definition of “extrajudicial killing” is derived from article 3 of the Ge-
neva Conventions. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 5 (1991). 
93 H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 3. 
94 Id. 
The TVPA would establish an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of 
action that has been successfully maintained under an existing law, section 
1350 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort Claims Act). . . . Section 
1350 has other important uses and should not be replaced. There should 
also, however, be a clear and specific remedy. 
Id. 
95 Id.; Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). 
96 H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 3. 
97 See id. 
98 See § 1350 note. 
99 See 106 Stat. at 73; H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 3. “The TVPA . . . provides significantly 
more guidance to those seeking to interpret and apply it. The TVPA creates an explicit 
cause of action for a narrow set of conduct, precisely defines that conduct . . . In short, it 
lacks the fundamental ambiguity that characterizes the ATS.” Philip Mariani, Assessing the 
Proper Relationship Between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 156 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1383, 1385 (2008). 
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ify the ATS in any way.100 Rather, Congress intended the TVPA to act as 
an unequivocal expression of two already accepted violations of the 
ATS.101 Despite its elementary nature, the TVPA provides modern rec-
ognition by a political branch that these claims are justiciable.102 In this 
way, the judiciary is empowered and emboldened to recognize action-
able claims of torture and extrajudicial killing.103
 While this may seem duplicative, Congressional recognition of ac-
tionable claims lends authority to the judiciary’s judgment over foreign 
parties.104 By enunciating actionable claims under the TVPA, courts are 
less apt to worry about their ability to divine the “law of nations” from 
interstitial federal common law.105 As the Senate report noted, the TVPA 
was designed to correct “at least one Federal judge [who] has ques-
tioned whether section 1350 can be used by victims of torture commit-
ted in foreign nations absent an explicit grant of a cause of action by 
Congress.”106 Even with universally accepted and customary interna-
tional law prohibitions against torture and extrajudicial killing, more 
conservative judges might otherwise feel squeamish deriving causes of 
action from the “law of nations.”107
 The Torture and Victim Protection Act also limits political ques-
tion and separation of powers challenges to the judiciary’s recognition 
of the ATS causes of action, at least for the two named violations.108 De-
spite the viability of a plaintiff’s claims, the uncomfortable situation of 
sitting in judgment of the actions of another sovereign nation might 
                                                                                                                      
100 H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 2 (“Official torture and summary execution violate stan-
dards accepted by virtually every nation. The universal consensus condemning these prac-
tices has assumed the statues of customary international law.”). 
101 See id. at 2–3. 
102 See id. at 3. 
103 See id. at 4. 
104 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004). 
105 See id. at 739. 
106 H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 4. In particular the House Report singled out Judge 
Bork’s concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 815 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), which “questioned the existence of a private right of action under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, reasoning that separation of powers principles required an explicit—and pref-
erably contemporary—grant by Congress of a private right of action.” Id. 
107 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring). While Justice Scalia concurred with 
the judgment in Sosa, he took issue with the judiciary’s ability to find actionable claims. See 
id. Justice Scalia wrote that doing so “would commit the Federal Judiciary to a task it is 
neither authorized nor suited to perform.” Id. 
108 See id. at 728. There has been a marked increase in these challenges under the cur-
rent Justice Department. Davis, supra note 2, at 118–25. “Of the thirty-seven cases in which 
the United States has participated, twenty-two of these occurred during the Bush admini-
stration. The Bush administration supported the defendant in every case.” Id. at 125. 
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have led courts to shy away from hearing viable human rights claims.109 
By amending the ATS with the TVPA, Congress put its stamp of ap-
proval on these claims, giving courts and skeptical judges a clear grant 
of jurisdiction.110 No longer would judges have to engage in the com-
plicated “eighteenth century paradigm” calculus of Sosa to determine 
whether torture and extrajudicial killing were actionable; the judiciary 
would have both a clear invitation to enforce these claims, as well as a 
definite and uniform standard of liability to apply.111
 As Justice Souter noted in his opinion in Sosa, it is preferable for 
Congress to define actionable claims under the ATS rather than rely on 
judicial interpretation of this enigmatic statute.112 The political 
branches of the United States government are given deference within 
the separation of powers scheme to deal with matters that implicate for-
eign relations.113 This is not to say that the judiciary is barred from hear-
ing or involving itself in matters involving foreign affairs; on the con-
trary, it is sometimes required to involve itself in matters that involve 
political or foreign policy.114 However, when a private cause of action is 
created, especially in the realm of foreign affairs, it is prudent to rely on 
the legislative branch.115
                                                                                                                      
109 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. Justice Souter argued that “[i]t is one thing for American 
courts to enforce constitutional limits on our own State and Federal Governments’ power, 
but quite another to consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on 
the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold that a foreign gov-
ernment or its agent has transgressed those limits.” Id. 
110 See H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 4. 
111 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. Justice Souter referenced the TVPA as providing a clear 
mandate to the courts in this opinion in Sosa. Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). In Baker, Justice Brennan noted that the 
reason for judicial deference under the political question doctrine in the field of foreign 
relations was because “resolution of such issues frequently turn on standards that defy 
judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the 
executive or legislature; [and] many such questions demand single voiced statement of the 
Government’s views.” Id. Furthermore, it is arguable that the grant of Article I, Section 8 
providing Congress with the power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed 
on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations” is a textual commitment to the 
legislative branch and therefore one to which the judiciary should defer. See U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 10; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
114 Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy 
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”). 
115 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. 
396 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:381 
IV. The Importance of Recognizing Corporate Liability for 
Violations of Human Rights 
 The importance of legislative action with respect to aiding and 
abetting liability is evident from the Torture and Victim Protection 
Act.116 While aiding and abetting liability undoubtedly enjoys a certain 
amount of international acceptance, it is by no means as clearly defined 
as torture or extrajudicial killing.117 Even with clear international stan-
dards for torture and extrajudicial killing, the judiciary remained con-
strained from enforcing viable claims due to prudential considerations 
until the TVPA.118 As the varying opinions in Khulumani made evident, 
both the source and the standard of complicity for aiding and abetting 
liability remain uncertain.119 Without legislative action, the success of 
viable aiding and abetting claims remains highly improbable.120 With 
legislative action, a definitive standard of liability similar to those laid 
down in the Torture Victim Protection Act could be enunciated.121 In 
this way, competing views of the appropriate standard of complicity 
would be avoided.122 Furthermore, skeptical jurists would no longer 
have to rely on limited federal common lawmaking ability, but would be 
                                                                                                                      
116 See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). As Professor Steinhardt noted, the TVPA counter-
vailed the separation of powers challenges of those who oppose the ATS by endorsing the 
ATS through the TVPA. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act: Theoretical and His-
torical Foundations of the Alien Tort Claims Act and Its Discontents: A Reality Check, 16 St. Tho-
mas L. Rev. 585, 594 (2004). 
117 See H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 2–3 (“Official torture and summary execution violate 
standards accepted by virtually every nation. The universal consensus condemning these 
practices has assumed the status of customary international law.”); Scarborough, supra 
note 75, at 481–82 (“The definition of corporate aiding and abetting liability for interna-
tional law violations is unlikely to be clear enough or universally condemned enough to 
satisfy the Sosa standard.”). 
118 H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 4. Legislative action would satisfy the major objection 
raised by the Justice Department with respect to aiding and abetting liability. Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 21, at 8 (“[T]he creation of civil aiding and 
abetting liability is a legislative act separate and apart from the recognition of a cause of 
action against the primary actor, and one that the courts should not undertake without 
congressional direction.”). 
119 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277, 288, 337 (2d Cir. 2007), 
aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom., Am. Izuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
120 Davis, supra note 2, at 233. The only successful resolution of an aiding and abetting 
claim was Doe v. Unocal, which was settled out of court. 403 F.3d 708, 708 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Saad Gul, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: An Assessment of Corpo-
rate Liability Under § 1350, 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 379, 409 (2007). 
121 See 106 Stat. at 73. 
122 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277, 288, 337. 
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restored to their more familiar job of interpreting and applying statu-
tory law.123
 It is important that Congress provide a remedy for aiding and abet-
ting liability not simply to clarify the murky waters of Sosa, but more im-
portantly to ensure victims redress and to prevent human rights viola-
tions by states and corporate actors.124 An example of one of the more 
poignant instances of the corporate complicity existed in Doe v. Uno-
cal.125 In Unocal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized aiding 
and abetting liability for Unocal’s role in atrocities committed by mem-
bers of the Myanmar military on local villagers from the Tenasserim re-
gion.126 Unocal Corporation utilized Myanmar military forces to secure 
the construction of an oil pipeline in Burma.127 While overseeing the 
construction of the pipeline, the Myanmar military forces raped, tor-
tured and murdered local Burmese citizens while working for Uno-
cal.128 There were clear implications that officials from Unocal were 
complicit in the violations.129 While settled out of court, the case was the 
first instance when a corporation was successfully held accountable un-
der the ATS for its involvement in gross human rights violations.130
 Aside from the overarching need for punishment and vindication 
of violations similar to Unocal, corporate accountability for aiding and 
abetting human rights is important for several other reasons.131 First 
and most basically, the ATS is a civil statute that contemplates money 
damages.132 One of the underlying purposes of tort law is to make vic-
tims whole by compensating them for their injuries.133 However, the 
majority of individual defendants held liable under the ATS are judg-
ment proof because they have no assets.134 Therefore, while victims are 
provided a forum to air their grievances, they are typically not “made 
                                                                                                                      
123 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 750 (2004). 
124 See generally Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing aiding and 
abetting liability for complicity in human rights violations including forced labor, murder 
and rape by the Myanmar military while constructing a pipeline). 
125 See id. 
126 Id. at 956. 
127 Id. at 936. 
128 Id. 
129 Unocal, 395 F.3d at 937–38. The court cited a particularly notorious quote by Uno-
cal president John Imle discussing the enlistment of the Burmese military for help with the 
pipeline. Davis, supra note 2, at 209. Imle stated that “‘if forced labor goes hand in glove 
with the military, yes there will be more forced labor.” Id. 
130 See Davis, supra note 2, at 211. 
131 See id. 
132 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
133 Victor Schwartz et al., Prosser, Wade and Schwartz’s Torts 1 (10th ed. 2000). 
134 See Davis, supra note 2, at 20. 
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whole,” at least in terms of monetary compensation.135 Conversely, if 
culpable, corporations provide victims with a responsible party able to 
appropriately compensate victims for their suffering.136
 Next, by holding corporations liable for their complicity, Congress 
would incentivize corporations to be proactive (as opposed to passive or 
even complicit) in ensuring that they are not involved in human rights 
violations.137 Without aiding and abetting liability, there is no form of 
accountability preventing corporations from turning a blind eye to op-
pressive regimes.138 Corporations, once having invested in an abusive 
regime, have an incentive to maintain the status quo in order to prevent 
any future challenges to their involvement.139 Furthermore, victims can-
not hope to seek redress in their own countries for human rights viola-
tions by corporate actors operating within their borders, especially if the 
state itself is involved in the abuses.140 By holding corporations liable for 
complicity in human rights violations, there is a real incentive for multi-
national businesses to actively oppose repressive regimes and voice their 
opposition to a repressive government’s actions, thereby engaging in a 
much more “constructive engagement.”141
Conclusion 
 It has been almost thirty years since the landmark decision of Filár-
tiga utilized the ATS to provide redress for a torture and murder that 
                                                                                                                      
135 See id.; Shriram Bhashyam, Note, Knowledge or Purpose? The Khulumani Litigation and 
the Standard for Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 30 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 245, 246 (2008). 
136 See Bhashyam, supra note 135, at 246. 
137 See Herz, supra note 20, at 222–23. Mr. Herz makes a very strong argument that 
corporate complicity furthers constructive engagement as opposed to the Justice Depart-
ment’s argument that third party liability would prevent corporations from investing in 
questionable states, thereby chilling the liberalizing effects of capitalism. See id. Mr. Herz 
rightly points out that U.S. companies are hardly promoting democracy and humans rights 
in their interactions with foreign governments if they are complicit in these same viola-
tions. See id. 
138 Id. at 210. 
139 Id. at 223. 
140 See H.R. Rep. No. 102–367, at 3. 
141 Herz, supra note 20, at 222–23. It is also arguable that the only way to reach a guilty 
state is by seeking redress through a proxy corporation. Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human 
Rights, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 505, 506–07 (2008). Professor Alford argues that while 
victims may not be able to seek redress from foreign states because of sovereign immunity, 
complicit corporations may be able to share responsibility through their contractual rela-
tions with a state or through arbitration. Id. In this way, victims are able to hold states li-
able, albeit through the third party proxy of a corporation. Id. 
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occurred in Paraguay.142 Since then, the ATS has allowed victims of 
human rights violations to confront their oppressors, seek redress for 
their suffering, and air their stories to the world.143 Litigation under 
the ATS since Filártiga has grown rapidly, with the most contentious and 
expansive litigation revolving around the area of corporate liability.144 
While several district courts recognize aiding and abetting liability as 
actionable under the ATS, it remains uncertain whether a cause of ac-
tion for corporate aiding and abetting liability would meet the Su-
preme Court’s stringent standards enunciated in Sosa.145 Furthermore, 
even if aiding and abetting liability is cognizable under the ATS, judges 
are likely to shy away from dealing with matters that delve so deeply 
into the foreign affairs of other countries and are therefore apt to dis-
miss the claims on prudential considerations.146 It is the prerogative of 
Congress to resolve this confusion and uncertainty.147 As it did with the 
TVPA, Congress would be able to provide a legitimate and unified voice 
with regards to corporate complicity in human rights violations.148 In 
doing so, Congress would send a clear signal to both the international 
community and to multinational corporations that such behavior is un-
acceptable and will be punished in United States courts.149
                                                                                                                      
142 See Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). The case “served notice 
that . . . [U.S.] courts are open to judge actions in any corner of the world.” Davis, supra 
note 2, at 21. 
143 See Brief of Amici Curiae International Human Rights Organizations, TRC Com-
missioners, and Others in Support of Plaintiffs at 3, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 
504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (03-CV-4524), aff’d for lack of quorum sub nom., Am. Izuzu Mo-
tors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). 
Plaintiffs in actions under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) often have no other 
avenue of relief. The vindication of their rights promotes healing, both for 
them and for their communities, with the official recognition that the depri-
vations they suffered are universally condemned. These cases often break 
down the walls of silence and fear, enabling survivors of unspeakable atroci-
ties to find dignity and composure. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
144 See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 258. 
145 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004) (stating that the creation of 
private rights of actions is best left to the legislature). But see Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 270 
(recognizing aiding and abetting liability). 
146 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727. 
147 See id. at 733; Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). 
148 106 Stat. at 73; Bornstein, supra note 35, at 1099–100. 
149 See 106 Stat. at 73. 
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